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Abstract: It has long been recognized in economics that individuals can derive benets
from a resource stock without directly or indirectly utilizing that resource. Such non-use
values, including existence values and bequest values, however, are often ignored in models
of resource management. In this paper, a simple, two-country model of the management
of a renewable resource is developed in which at least one country has a non-economic
interest in the conservation of the sh stock to examine the impact of such a non-use value
on the end-of-period harvest and self-enforcing sharing rule. The model shows that this
non-lucrative pursuit serves to decrease the total allowable catch for each period at the
expense of the catch share of the more conservation-oriented country, a result is consistent
with the September 1995 decision by NAFO ending the dispute between Canada and the
European Union over turbot.
* The comments of Charles Plourde, Mike Fraidenburg, Charles Paulsen, and an anony-
mous referee are greatly appreciated.
1 Introduction and Background
In early 1995, a \sh war," which gained considerable public attention, erupted between
Canada and the European Union (EU) over turbot, also known as the Greenland halibut.
The conict arose from Spanish and Portuguese alleged overshing in the area o the
coast of Canada but outside the two hundred nautical mile limit on the Grand Banks
of Newfoundland. To justify its overshing above the quota set by the fteen-country
North Atlantic Fishery Organization (NAFO), the European Union cited the persistent
low Canadian share of the turbot caught as an indication of excessively high quotas set
for Canada. In contrast, Canada claimed that its low catch share was the immediate
consequence of the continued overshing by the European Union and other NAFO members.
The dispute has only recently come to an end, with Canada and the European Union
agreeing on a total allowable catch for 1996 of 20,000 tonnes, approximately 26% lower than
that set by NAFO for 1995, and on their respective catch shares of 15% and 55%. While
the total allowable catch limits have followed a downward trend in previous years, from
over 100,000 tonnes in 1989 to just 20,000 tonnes in 1996, the catch shares have undergone
a drastic change, as in the past Canada would typically be granted more than fty percent
of the total allowable catch, and the European Union would consequently receive less than
fty percent. The steady decline of the total allowable catch is likely a consequence of
the signicant decrease of turbot stocks in recent years to dangerous levels. In fact, even
though estimates of the stock size of turbot vary substantially, most conform to the view
that turbot could face extinction if the overshing of the 1980s and early 1990s were to
continue.
That greater emphasis on the conservation of turbot has induced NAFO to set a lower
total allowable catch for 1996 is consistent with the prediction of the innite-horizon model
developed by Missios and Plourde (1995), in which the steady state total allowable harvest
is chosen as to maximize the sum of the two countries objective functionals subject to the
relevant constraints. The driving force of their model is the assumption that one of the two
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countries, denoted the Home country and identied with Canada in the turbot war, has a
non-pecuniary incentive to conserve the sh stock in addition to being prot-maximizing,
and thus receives benets from both the harvest and the level of the sh stock. From the
continuous time specication of the model, though, a detailed analysis of the sharing rule
becomes impossible. Prior to this study, the extent of countries conservation attitudes has
been measured by the magnitude of discount factors; specically, higher discount factors,
implying greater emphasis on the future, have been taken to be equivalent to more con-
servationist positions. However, discount factors merely represent countries' willingness to
trade present prot for future prot, so their relatively high levels are necessary but not
sucient to prevent optimal extinction in a nite-horizon setup. On the other hand, if
countries derive a non-use value (that is, a value derived neither from direct nor indirect
use of the resource stock) from the resource, then reasons of a social, political, ideological,
or moral nature exist to conserve the sh stock and extinction is no longer possible as an
optimal outcome, given that countries are now utility-maximizing and their utility is not
independent of the level of the sh stock. The prime examples of these non-use values are
known in the literature as existence value, which refers to preservation for its own sake,
and bequest value, which refers to conservation for future generations' use (see Krutilla,
1967). Bishop and Welsh (1992) nd evidence that existence values likely exist for species
which are obscure or even unknown. Non-use values provide an additional incentive to leave
part of the resource stock unharvested (beyond the intertemporal prot-maximization and
cost-savings incentives), applying even in the nal period in a nite horizon when other
prot-based incentives disappear. The existence of a non-use value for at least one country
is important not only in the determination of optimal harvests, as Missios and Plourde
show, but also in that of catch shares.1
In the present paper, we address the harvest division issue in a two-period model of the
type proposed by Vislie (1987) and extended by Ferrara and Missios (1995), and derive a
1By assuming that the catch shares are determined prior to the negotiation of the total allowable catch,
Missios and Plourde do not need to consider the question of how the harvest is divided between the two
countries.
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self-enforcing contract between two countries, at least one of which is assumed to receive
a non-use benet from the stock. Like Missios and Plourde, we nd that the harvest or
total allowable catch is smaller compared to that of the benchmark case in which neither
of the countries receives a non-use value; furthermore, we show that the harvest share of
the country with such a motive is less than fty percent in both periods, a result which is
consistent with NAFO's decision to assign Canada only 15% of the total allowable catch for
1996.
2 The Model
We consider two countries, denoted the Home country and the Foreign country, which are
engaged in a two-period exploitation of a transboundary renewable natural resource, such
as sh, and which (in the absence of reliable enforcement mechanisms) need to design a
contract specifying both the total allowable catches and the sharing rules that neither party
has any incentive to breach. For the sake of exposition, we assume that the two countries
face a world demand for harvested sh that is innitely elastic, implying a parametric price,
p,2 and an identical constant unit cost of extraction, c.3 In a bargaining situation where
the agreement is negotiated at the beginning of the rst period, the two countries maximize
the product of their individual gains from cooperation, subject to the relevant constraints,
and obtain dynamic consistency (or self-enforcement) by incorporating into the two-period
Nash-product the optimal second-period catch shares. A Nash-product is the product of
the net benets from cooperation to each country, and the \two-period Nash-product" is
simply the product of present values of the net benets from cooperation. This yields a
solution which is Pareto-optimal so that making one country better o must be done so at
2This assumption, made by both Munro (1979) and Vislie, removes the \market\ externality associ-
ated with the impact of management decisions on the price, leaving only the dynamic or stock externality
associated with the eects of the same decisions on the sh biomass.
3The assumption of a constant extraction cost, as opposed to a cost decreasing in the level of the sh
stock, will have no impact on the sharing rule in either period. Although a stock-dependent cost would lower
the harvest in the rst period because of the \marginal stock eect" developed by Clark (1976), by which
additional sh are left unharvested in order to decrease the future harvesting cost, our conclusions regarding
the impact of non-use values under both equal and diering no-agreement payos will remain unchanged.
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the expense of the other country.4
Here we will initially consider the general case in which the payos without cooperation
are not necessarily equal, as in the Canada-European Union turbot dispute, as a result
of one countries' proximity to the resource,5 and later consider the simpler equal payo
specication. We dene BHt , and B
F
t as the no-agreement payos in period t, and B
H and
BF as the two-period discounted no-agreement payos, of the Home country and Foreign
country.
The Home country is assumed to hold a non-use value and thus benets from both the
harvest and the sh left unharvested, so that its objective functional is
WH = V (x1) + 1(p  c)h1 + H [V (x2) + 2(p  c)h2]; (1)
where xt , t , and ht are the sh biomass, the Home country's share, and the total harvest
in period t, respectively, and H =
1
1+rH
is the Home country's discount factor,6 and where
V 0(xt) > 0 and V 00(xt)  0 . On the other hand, the Foreign country does not receive
utility from the level of the sh stock and therefore remains purely prot-oriented, so that
its objective functional is
WF = (1  1)(p  c)h1 + F (1  2)(p  c)h2; (2)
where F is the Foreign country's discount factor. The two countries therefore choose the
total harvest and sharing rule for both periods by maximizing the two-period Nash-product,
fV (x1) + 1(p  c)h1 + H [V (x2) + 2(p  c)h2] (3)
 BHgf(1  1)(p  c)h1 ++F (1  2)(p  c)h2  BF g; (4)
4Nash (1953) demonstrated that the maximization of the Nash-product yields the only solution that
satises the axioms of feasibility, independence of irrelevant alternatives, rationality, and symmetry, in
addition to Pareto-optimality.
5For example, the European Union can only employ \oshore" technologies that must incorporate both
the harvesting and the processing (e.g., canning and freezing) of the sh caught.
6It is possible for the Home country to discount prots and utility at dierent rates. In particular, utility
is sometimes discounted at the rate of \impatience\ and prots at the appropriate rate of interest. While
the former refers to preferences, the latter refers to opportunities. See Silberberg (1990), 419-426. Here, we
assume that these two rates coincide.
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such that
0  t  1; (5)
0  ht  hMAX ; (6)
and
xt = xt 1 + F (xt 1)  ht  0: (7)
where hMAX is determined by economic catch constraints, and F (xt 1) is the biomass
growth function. Since the countries seek a self-enforcing contract, they need to take into
account the second-period harvest and sharing rule which maximize the second-period Nash-
product,
[V (x2) + 2(p  c)h2  BH2 ][(1  2)(p  c)h2  BF2 ]; (8)
subject to the above constraints for t = 2, when choosing the rst-period harvest and catch
shares.
The constrained maximization of (7) with respect to 2 yields
2 =
1
2
+
(BH2  BF2 )  V (x2)
2(p  c)h2 ; (9)
and with respect to h2 upon substitution for 2 from (8) yields
p  c = V 0(x2); (10)
which states that the marginal benet from harvesting, i.e., the constant average prot
from the harvest, must be equated to the second-period marginal benet the Home country
receives from leaving the sh unharvested. Only if the agreed-upon rst-period harvest and
catch shares are such that this condition is satised in the second period will the two-period
contract be self-enforcing so that neither party has any incentive to deviate from it.
For the rst period, the sharing rule and total harvest must satisfy
WH  BH =WF  BF ; (11)
or
V (x1) + (21   1)(p  c)h1 + H   F
2
[V (x2) + (p  c)h2]  (BH  BF ) = 0; (12)
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and
f V 0(x1) + 1(p  c) + H
2
[V 0(x2)
@x2
@h1
+ (p  c)@h2
@h1
]g[WF  BF ]
+f(1  1)(p  c) + F
2
[V 0(x2)
@x2
@h1
+ (p  c)@h2
@h1
]g[WH  WH ] = 0: (13)
Rearranging (11), we obtain that
1 =
1
2
  V (x1)
2(p  c)h1  
(H   F )[h2(p  c) + V (x2)]
4(p  c)h1 (14)
+
[(BH  BF )  (H+F )2 (BH2  BF2 )]
2(p  c)h1 : (15)
Manipulating (12) and using (9), (10), and @x2=@h1 + @h2=@h1 =  [1 + F 0(x1)], we have
that
V 0(x1)  (p  c) + (H + F )
2
[1 + F 0(x1)](p  c) = 0: (16)
By (9) and (14) we conrm the result obtained by Ferrara and Missios that the as-
sumption of diering default payos has no impact on the choices of the optimal rst- and
second-period harvests; in other words, the second-period harvest maximizing the second-
period Nash-product and the rst-period harvest maximizing the two-period Nash-product
are independent of the corresponding no-agreement payos. However, the assumption does
have an eect on the choices of the optimal rst- and second-period sharing rule; as indi-
cated by (8) and (13), 2 is positively related to the dierence between the Home country's
second-period breakdown payo and that of the Foreign country, and 1 is positively re-
lated to the average \perceived value" of the rst-period no-agreement payo dierential.7
On the other hand, a non-use value on the part of the Home country aects not only the
sharing rule but also the harvest choice. In particular, it reduces 2, may increase or de-
crease 1, depending on the dierence between the two countries' discount factors,
8 and
serves to increase the sh stock levels, and thus decrease the harvests, in both periods by
the concavity of the growth function.
7The numerator of the fourth term on the right-hand-side of (13) is one-half of the sum of the rst-period
non-cooperative payo dierential discounted by H and the same dierential but discounted by F .
8The derivative of 1 with respect to the dierence between H and F is negative; in fact, if the Home
country is more future-oriented and thus willing to accept a lower harvest today for a larger one tomorrow,
then it has to compensate the Foreign country with a higher current catch share.
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If the Foreign country receives a higher payo under non-cooperation than the Home
country in each period, that is, BHi < B
F
i , for i = 1; 2, 2 is unambiguously less than one
half, given that both the dierential and the benet to the Home country from the second-
period sh stock left unharvested work in the same direction to increase the bargaining
power of the Foreign country. In other words, the Home country is willing to accept a
lower second-period catch share in return for a lower harvest, and thus a higher sh stock;
further, for an agreed upon harvest, the Home country has to accept an even lower share
because of the Foreign country's better default position.9 In the rst period, the Home
country is to receive a share less than one half, again provided that the Foreign country is
not signicantly more future-oriented, or that F  H , for the same reasons as discussed
above. The result that 2 and 1 are both less than one half holds as well for the identical
breakdown payo case, or BHi = B
F
i , for i = 1; 2.
For BH > BF , whether the former agrees to a catch of less than fty percent of the total
harvest in the second period depends on the magnitude of the second-period default payo
dierential relative to the benet the Home country receives from the sh left unharvested.
As intuition suggests and (8) conrms, the larger the dierential is relative to the benet,
a benet which in turn depends on the strength of the conservation commitment, the more
likely the Home country must receive more than fty percent of the second-period harvest
to conform to the agreement. Similarly, under the assumption that the two countries have
identical discount factors, the Home country agrees to a rst-period catch share less than
one-half if the rst-period average breakdown payo dierential is less than the benet from
the sh stock at the end of the same period. On the other hand, if the discount factors dier,
and, in particular, if H > F , implying that the Home country places more emphasis on
the future, a dynamically consistent settlement between the two countries has to assign the
more future- and conservation-oriented country more than fty percent of the rst-period
9In Munro (1979), compensation is made through explicit \side-payments," although the need for such
compensation arises from dierences in discount factors, shing eort costs, and/or consumer preferences.
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total catch if
(H   F )
2
[(p  c)h2 + V (x2)] + V (x1) < BH  BF   (H + F )
2
(BH2  BF2 ); (17)
that is, if the sum of the average social net benet from the Home country's higher discount
factor and the benet from the rst-period sh biomass is smaller than the average perceived
value of the rst-period no-agreement payo dierential. The result is again intuitive, as
the Home country bargaining power is positively related to its relative non-cooperative
advantage over the Foreign country, but negatively to the benet from the sh stock and
the discount factor dierential. Clearly, the more favourable default position the Home
country enjoys serves to increase its catch shares in both periods. However, while in the
absence of the non-use value the Home country must receive a harvest share greater than
fty percent in the second period and, under the assumption of identical discount factors,
in the rst period,10 here it is still possible for the country to agree upon a share smaller
than fty percent if its utility from the sh biomass is greater than the non-cooperative
payo dierential.
The results that the rst-period harvest is smaller and that the Home country's share
is less than fty percent are consistent with the terms of the September 1995 agreement
with NAFO ending the dispute between Canada and the European Union over turbot,
whereby Canada is entitled to catch only 3,000 tonnes of turbot for 1996, or 15% of the
total allowable catch. The decision by NAFO seems to have been dictated by the need of
a settlement that would accommodate the two parties' conicting positions and prevent
future losses associated with the reoccurrence of sh wars (non-cooperation).11 Specically,
10In such a case, both the rst- and second-period shares are greater than one-half by the average ratio
of the default payo dierential to the harvesting prots for the corresponding period, that is,
2 =
1
2
+
(BH2  BF2 )
2(p  c)h2 ;
and
1 =
1
2
+
[(BH  BF )  (BH2  BF2 )]
2(p  c)h1 :
11Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Plourde and Yeung (1989) show that cooperation Pareto-dominates
non-cooperation with two countries and n countries, respectively.
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NAFO seems to have taken into account Canada's apparent greater future orientation12
and ideological commitment to conservation, and the increased risk of turbot extinction
resulting from the continued overshing by the European Union. That Canada has a more
conservation-oriented attitude is also in concert with the observation over recent years of its
low share of the turbot caught, around 20%, in spite of its high allowable catch share, over
60%, and the visible signs of non-cooperative behaviour of the European Union. Obviously,
if Canada's sole objective had been maximization of harvesting prots, then it would have
responded to the overshing of some NAFO members by shing itself above the set quota.
Instead, in light of the declining stock of turbot, apparently the last commercially viable
sh stock in the North Atlantic, it chose to sh below its allowable quota, and this clearly
identies conservation as one of the key determinants of Canada's policies regarding sheries.
For Canada, the decision by NAFO to set the total allowable catch for 1996 at a level
lower than that of 1995 may signify an increase in the benet received from the sh stock at
the end of the year, a benet which is only partially oset by the loss in the harvesting prots
resulting from the lower 1996 total harvest. For the European Union, on the other hand, the
smaller total allowable catch amounts exclusively to a loss in the prots from its share of the
total harvest. Therefore, had NAFO limited itself to a reduction in the 1996 total allowable
catch by about 26% relative to the 1995 harvest, and had Canada and the European Union
accepted the decision, the latter would have not delayed to deviate from the negotiated
sharing rule, as it would have not been willing to pay for the increase in the welfare of the
former without adequate compensation. In the context of the dispute over turbot, given
the absence of a legally binding agreement which requires not only monitoring13 but also a
system able to severely punish the parties deviating from the agreed-upon terms, Canada,
which gains from NAFO decision to allow a smaller total turbot catch for 1996 at expense
12European interest rates, which can be regarded as a rough proxy for discount rates, have been tra-
ditionally higher than Canadian interest rates, implying a lower discount factor for the European Union,
consequently a greater future-orientation for Canada. This claim is supported by the notorious reputation
of the main European Union eets (Spain and Portugal) as exploitive. Notwithstanding, Canada has also
been involved in similar incidents, but not to the same extent.
13One of the terms of the September 1995 agreement is that vessels be monitored by satellite. Monitoring,
however, may be necessary but certainly not sucient to bind parties to their commitments regarding future
actions.
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of the European Union, has to somehow compensate the latter in order to prevent it from
overshing.
NAFO, which is likely to also aim at minimizing the costs associated with the continued
switching from cooperation to non-cooperation and vice versa, seems to have given due
attention to the need of a dynamically consistent agreement, and thus to the requirement
that the European Union must be compensated for the loss in the net prots from its share
of the harvest. This would explain the other NAFO decision, which won the support of
both Canada and the European Union, to assign the former only 15% and the latter 55%
of the total harvest, 75% lower and 337% higher, respectively, than the 1995 catch shares,
or, in terms of the allowable quantity of turbot, a maximum of 3,000 tonnes for Canada,
81% lower than the 1995 quota, and a maximum of 11,000 tonnes for the European Union,
223% higher than the 1995 quota.
3 A Self-Enforcing Agreement When Both Countries Re-
ceive Non-use Values
Until now we have been concerned with situations in which only one country benets from
the sh stock and made no mention that both countries may pursue conservation for non-
lucrative reasons, even if to dierent extents. This possibility arises in the context of
the salmon dispute between Canada and the United States, as they are both known to
contemplate policies aiming at preserving the natural status quo.14 Paradoxically, the
century-old conict has been recently exacerbated by the decision of the American President
Bill Clinton to ban salmon shing in the area from California to the Canadian border in
order to avoid the complete depletion of the US-spawned salmon, a resolution that carries
the name of conservation but does not exclude the strategic attempt of the United States
to expropriate some of the prots from the harvesting of the Canadian-spawned salmon. In
fact, US shermen responded by moving to Alaska, thereby adding to the pressure on the
14Munro and Stokes (1989) point out that the salmon dispute is not simply between Canada and the
United States, as there is considerable antagonism between Washington, Oregon and Alaska. However, if we
assume that the United States can solve their internal conicts by a self-enforcing division of their national
quota, then Canada will have to negotiate only with the United States as a whole.
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salmon originating in British Columbia. In turn, Canadian shermen, on instruction of the
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, began to sh the Fraser river aggressively
in order to deny the catch to Americans, contributing to devastate the west coast salmon
shery.
In view of the dangers of competition in common-access sheries in the absence of an
international system that provides safeguards against the actions of self-interested entities,
dynamic consistency or self-enforcement becomes a vital requirement in any cooperative
attempt to address the total allowable catch and harvest division issues. For completeness,
we nd it necessary to adapt the above model to encompass the case in which both countries
have some incentive to conserve the sh stock. Given that the analysis is of most relevance
in the evaluation of the positions of Canada and the United States in potential resolutions
of the salmon dispute, and that neither of the two countries seems to have a relative better
position in the harvesting of salmon under non-cooperation, we assume identical and equal
to zero breakdown payos and introduce U(xt); to represent the benet the Foreign country
receives from the sh biomass, with U 0(xt) > 0 and U 00(xt)  0, so that its objective
functional is now
WF = U(x1) + (1  1)(p  c)h1 + F [U(x2) + (1  2)(p  c)h2]: (18)
Under the same constraints and assumptions about the price and cost structures as before,
the two countries stipulate a contract in which the sharing rule and total allowable catch
maximizing the second-period Nash-product are given by
2 =
1
2
+
[U(x2)  V (x2)]
2(p  c)h2 ; (19)
and
p  c = [V 0(x2) + U 0(x2)]; (20)
respectively, and the rst-period terms maximizing the product of the objective functionals
of the two countries, or two-period Nash-product, subject to (among the other relevant re-
strictions) the condition that (21) and (22) are satised, so that self-enforcement is ensured,
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are given by
1 =
1
2
+
[(U(x1)  V (x1)]
2(p  c)h1 +
(F   H)[U(x2) + V (x2) + (p  c)h2]
4(p  c)h1 ; (21)
and
V 0(x1)  (p  c) + U 0(x1) + (H + F )
2
[1 + F 0(x1)](p  c) = 0: (22)
Although we cannot determine whether the Home country is to receive a higher harvest
share in either period or both periods unless we have a proxy for the benet derived from
the sh stock or at least some kind of relative measure of the extent of the two countries
commitment to conservation, we are able to conclude that the Home country's marginal
cost of not harvesting in terms of its catch share is lower here than in the case where the
Foreign country does not hold a non-use value, as in the present framework both countries
benet from the level of the sh stock, and therefore there is no longer the need for the Home
country to fully compensate the Foreign country with a higher share in exchange for a larger
sh biomass. On the other hand, we are able to assert without a shadow of a doubt that the
total allowable catch satisfying (22), which says that the constant average harvesting prot
has to be equal to the sum of the two countries respective marginal benets from the sh
stock, is smaller than that from (14), and, similarly, the sh stock satisfying (24) is larger
than that from (18), by the concavity of the utility functions. In conclusion, the assumption
that even the Foreign country has some non-economic interest in the conservation of the
sh stock results in a lower total harvest and higher catch share of the Home country in
both periods.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have examined the impact of non-use values on the optimal choice of
dynamically consistent total harvest and catch shares in a two-period, two-country setting.
Notwithstanding the simplicity of the model, we have been able to show the very intuitive
result that the more a country benets from the sh stock, or the more committed to
conservation it is, the larger the portion of the harvest it has to forego in order to induce
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the other country to accept a reduction in the total allowable catch. This tradeo holds
independently of whether the two countries share the non-use value, and of their respective
threat-point positions. In other words, if both countries gain from the sh stock and for
reasons completely unrelated to its potential of enhancing future harvesting prots, in any
self-enforcing contract it is the party benetting the most from leaving the sh unharvested
that has to receive a lower share of a lower second-period or future harvest, as the second
period can be roughly thought of as representing the future, and of a lower rst-period, or
present, harvest. Diering discount factors, with the more conservation-oriented country
also placing more emphasis on the future, have a negative eect on the catch share of the
less present-oriented country but only in the rst-period, contributing therefore to reduce
its already less than one-half harvest portion. On the other hand, diering breakdown
positions, with the conservation-committed country enjoying a better payo under non-
cooperation, have a positive impact on the same share, thus making it possible for the
country with the higher default payo to receive more of the harvest in both periods if the
negative eect of its non-economic incentive to conserve the sh stock, which also result in
a lower total allowable catch, is more than oset by the positive eect of its better default
position.
Even though the conclusions of the models above presented are seemingly applicable
to the current conicts in shery management, our analysis is also intended to stress the
importance of clearly identifying all the variables relevant to the decision-making of the
various parties involved in any such dispute. In fact, far from aiming at criticizing the
often assumed prot-maximizing objective, we have shown how a simple variation in the
behaviour of at least one of the parties inuences not only the optimal level of the sh stock,
but also the self-enforcing sharing rule. Understanding the determinants of the behaviour of
the countries exploiting a transboundary shery then becomes essential in the formulation
of lasting cooperative policies.
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